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parents, there may be potential danger in making the child's welfare, as determined by a state agency, the only consideration in deciding adoption issues.
Only where a court has already deprived a parent of custody or guardianship, his consent is and should not be required.,6 In the instant case, the father
may well be regarded as having forfeited his rights.7 Thus, the outcome of the
principal case would probably have been the same had it arisen in Illinois or
some other state requiring consent.' 8
SEC-Registration of Securities-Failure to Register Resulting in Penal Action against Broker Redistributing for Person Controlling Issuer-[Federal].-The
respondent, a broker-dealer using the medium of the New York Stock Exchange,
sold a substantial number of shares for a person controlling the issuer. Although
the shares were registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there was
no registration statement in effect under the Securities Act of 1933 as the issue
had originally been distributed prior to the 1933 act. The SEC, proceeding
under authority granted by the 1934 act' to penalize brokers who have wilfully
violated the Securities Act of 1933, ruled that the respondent's transactions
were not within the exemptions of the 1933 act, and that the respondent was
therefore acting as an underwriter within the terms of the act and should have
16Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1940) tit. 27, § 3. Generally, the termination of parental rights
should be decided in separate proceedings and should not become an issue in the adoption
action. The conflict between such rights and the welfare of the child is a separate issue from
the adoption itself. Many states provide for such termination in custody or guardianship proceedings in a juvenile court on recommendation of a social or administrative agency. Courts
specializing in human relationships or domestic problems are more competent to deal with the
various factors determining parental qualifications. Such determinations should be made
only after a complete investigation by a worker trained in evaluating the importance of
natural parents in relation to the welfare of the child.
'7 Even states requiring consent provide for the forfeiture of parental rights where the parent has abandoned, deserted or neglected the child. 4 Vernier, American Family Laws
346-93 (1936). In these situations parental rights have been terminated by the actions of the
parent. Moreover if the parent has been imprisoned or adjudged insane, is a drug addict or
habitual drunkard, his consent to the adoption is not required since he is deemed to be unfit to
fulfill his obligations. Ibid.
IsBaker v. Strahom, 33 Ill. App. 59 (x889). The court allowed the grandparents to adopt
their grandchild over the objection of the father. The mother had obtained a divorce on grounds
of desertion and had been awarded custody. The court indicated that the welfare of the
child is of prime importance, and caprice, obstinacy or opposition on the part of the nonconsenting parent should not be regarded. Ibid., at 6o. Nims, The Illinois Adoption Law and
Its Administration (1928). The Illinois rule is not changed in this respect by the new adoption statute. Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. i945) C. 4, § 4-.
I Section r5 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empowers the Commission to revoke the registration of any broker who has wilfully violated any provision of the Securities
Act of 1933.48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 780 (b) (1941). Section 15 A (1) (2)
authorizes the Commission to suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months or to expel
from a registered securities association any member thereof who has wilfully violated any
provision of the Securities Act. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 780-3 (1) (2)
(194i).
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registered the securities prior to their sale. 2 The respondent's membership in
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., was accordingly suspended
for a period of twenty days. In the Matter of Ira Haupt &"Co.3
The SEC's ruling, requiring registration of unsolicited brokers' transactions,
represents a departure from previous administrative interpretations, and illustrates the Commission's view of the flexibility of the Securities Act of 1933 and
its adaptability to changing market conditions. The general purpose of the
act is to protect the investing public by promoting disclosure of information
concerning securities publicly offered4 through the mails or in interstate commerce. To this end the filing of registration statements and the use of prospectuses is made a prerequisite to the sale of all but certain exempted securities. Although shares originally distributed prior to the act are exempt from the registration requirements,s this exemption has been denied in the case of a resale to
the public of a substantial number of shares held by persons controlling the issuer6 on the ground that such a secondary distribution "may possess all the
248 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, is U.S.C.A. § 77e (a) (x94').
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3845 (x946).
4 Although the terms "public offering" and "distribution" are not defined in the Securities
Act, it has been said that they refer to every part of a pre-arranged program for the distribution of a substantial block of securities by means of which it finally reaches the investing public. In the matter of Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764 (1937), aff'd Oklahoma-Texas
Trust v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, ioo F. 2d 888 (C.C.A. ioth, x939). While there are
no fixed standards as to the amount of shares to be offered or of the number of offerees necessary to bring the transactions within the terms "public offering" of "distribution," certain
criteria have been offered by the SEC's legal staff; one must consider all the circumstances
surrounding the transactions including the number of offerees and their relationship to each
other and the issuer, the number of blocks of shares offered, the size of the offering, and the
manner of the offering. Opinion of General Counsel of Securities and Exchange Comm'n,
Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 285 (i935). In the instant case, although the precise extent
of the distribution could not be predetermined as it was conditioned upon the market price, the
commission found, nevertheless, that a distribution within the meaning of the act had been
made because it was clearly intended that a substantial block of shares would be sold.
s Section 3 (a) (i) of the Securities Act of 1933,48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, i

U.S.C.A.

§ 77C (a) (1) (1941), exempts "Any security which prior to .... the enactment of this title
has been sold or disposed of by the issuer."
6 1 ....
but this exemption shall not apply to 'any new offering of such security by an issuer
or underwriter." Ibid. In referring to the definition of an "underwriter" in section 2 (11), the
House report explains that "The last sentence of this definition defining 'issuer' to include ....
persons controlling the issuer has two functions .... its second function is to bring within the
provisions of the bill redistributions whether of outstanding issues or issues sold subsequently to the enactment of the bill. All the outstanding stock of a particular corporation may be
owned by one individual or a select group of individuals. At some future date they may wish to
dispose of their holdings and to make an offer of this stock to the public. Such a public offering
may possess all the dangers attendant upon a new offering of securities. Wherever such a redistribution reaches significant proportions the distributor would be in the position of controlling
the issuer and thus able to furnish the information demanded by the bill. This being so,
the distributor is treated as equivalent to the original issuer and, if he seeks to dispose of the
issue through a public offering, he becomes subject to the act. The concept of control herein
involved is not a narrow one depending upon a mathematical formula of 51 per cent of voting
power, but is broadly defined to permit the provisions of the act to become effective wherever
the fact of control actually exists." H. Rep. 85, 3d Cong., ist Sess. 13-14 (1933).
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dangers attendant upon a new offering."7 Since the respondent in the instant
case sold shares in connection with a secondary distribution, his actions constitute him an underwriter within the meaning of the act' and subject to its registration requirements unless he is permitted to take advantage of the special exemption permitting unsolicited broker's transactions to be effected without prior
registration.9 It has been only comparatively recently that substantial distributions could be made without active solicitations by brokers connected with the
distribution."' Before the development of the recent seller's market, members of
the Commission's legal staff had suggested that active solicitations were necessary to deny the benefit of the special exemption even where the broker claiming
the exemption was clearly an underwriter by reason of his connection with the
distribution,,, Indeed, six months before the instant ruling the SEC confirmed
this conclusion by their ruling in In the Matter of The United Corp.12 permitting
that corporation to dispose of common stock of a subsidiary through brokers on
the exchange without prior registration of the issue under the Securities Act.
That situation was, however, distinguishable from the instant case since the entire transaction was effected under the supervision of the commission pursuant
to Rule U-ioo promulgated under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935. Although there were solicitations present in the instant case, the commission did not base its determination upon that fact, but explicitly stated that the
prior interpretations of the act were not controlling since they had been de7 H.

Rep. 85, 73d Cong. ist Sess. 13-14 (1933.
Section 2 (1i) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines an underwriter as "any person who
.... sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security ..... As used in
the paragraph the term 'issuer' shall include.... any person.... controlling the issuer ..
s

48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, is U.S.C.A. § 77b (ix) (1941).
948 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, i5 U.S.C.A. 77d (2) (I94).
For an interesting commentary on public buying habits during the recent seller's market
see Velie, Babes in Wall Street, 117 Collier's 12 (April 27, 1946).
11A former General Counsel for the Securities and Exchange Commission had stated that
"It follows that even though the broker acting for the affiliated stockholder were to be held an
underwriter, it would still be possible for his transactions to be entitled to the exemption
afforded by Section 4(2) for unsolicited 'brokers transactions.' Implicit in this term would
appear to be the requirement that the purported broker receive only his usual and customary
commission, in connection with such sales, and that he effect such sales only by means customarily employed by a broker in the usual and regular execution of customers' orders. It
would seem inevitable, as a practical matter, that where an affiliated stockholder is endeavoring
to effect a disposition of all or a substantial part of his holdings, a broker or brokers executing
transactions on his behalf would go beyond the function properly exercised in transactions
with Section 4(2) and would therefore not be entitled to exemption under that Section."
Throop and Lane, Some Problems of Exemption under the Securities Act of 1933, 4 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 89 (1937). And see letter of former Security and Exchange Commissioner
Edmunde Burke, Jr., Memorandum on Behalf of Respondents 43, In the Matter of Ira Haupt
& Co., SEC Docket No. N.Y. 2284 (1946).
- Holding Company Act of 1935, Releases Nos. 6337 (i945), 64o9 and 6649 (1946). It may
be suggested that since the SEC's ruling granting the application was not in terms restricted
to unsolicited brokers' transactions the commission has implied that even solicited purchases
do not require registration.
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veloped against the background of a buyer's market in which disposal of a substantial number of shares without some solicitation was improbable.'3 Although
the securities involved were registered under the Securities Exchange Act, the
additional protection afforded investors under the Securities Act of 1933 justifies the increased burden imposed upon brokers by this ruling.'4 This additional
protection is of no avail, however, unless it is utilized by the investor. It has
been said that a basic policy of the act is to protect investors by making available to them during the twenty day "cooling period" all the information necessary to an intelligent, informed evaluation of the worth of the securities prior
to their purchase. s It would seem that this policy cannot be effectuated without
modification of the act with respect to the prospectus. At present, sales of securities are permitted if "accompanied or preceeded by a prospectus,"- 6 and the
broker complies with the act by delivering copies of the prospectus to the exchange for re-delivery to purchasers upon the sale. 7 This practice closes an important avenue of reliable information until after the sale and makes the prospectus serve as a "rain check" rather than as an advisory instrument, i.e., inadequacy of the information contained in the prospectus may afford the purchaser a basis. for recovery under the civil liabilities provisions of the Securities
Act of I933.1 8 Tge commission Liad considered this problem when it was presented by a similar practice of dealers who market new securities over the
counter-the taking of orders over the telephone as soon as the registration
statement became effective and the delivering of prospectuses with the confirmation.19 The commission's tentative solution, permitting the use of a sum13In the Matter of Ira Haupt & Co., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 3485
(1946).
14 Although the information contained in both acts is somewhat similar, the Securities Act
affords additional protection to the investor because it contains more detailed disclosures relating to underwriters and promoters and its provisions pertaining to civil liabilities facilitate
recovery by the investor. For comparisons of the adts see Hanna, The Securities Exchange
Act as Supplementary of the Securities Act, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 256 (i937); Civil
Liability for Misstatements in Documents Filed under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 Yale L. J. 456 (i935).
15Address by James J. Caffrey, The Dissemination of Information under the Securities
Act, Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 3165 (1946).
1648 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, I5 U.S.C.A. § 77e (b) (2) (r941).
X7 Rule x53, General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended
(1946).
8 48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 1, U.S.C.A. § 77k (1941); 48 Stat. 84 (1933), I5 U.S.C.A.
§ 771 (I94x).
'9 The comfnission hopes to encourage full use of the waiting period to disseminate information by providing that the use of a "red herring," prepared on the basis of the information
contained in the registration statement as amended to correct the deficiencies pointed out in
the commission's first letter of comment, will not be deemed an unlawful offer or solicitation
of an offer. Further encouragement to the use of the "red herring" is afforded by the proposal
that it be permitted to serve as a final lawful prospectus if the persons receiving it are sent
short supplementary documents containing furtler information necessary to correct deficiencies of the registration statement as of its effective date. This would prevent the waste
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mary and encouraging the use of the "red herring" prospectus, while suited to
the relatively leisurely transactions effected over the counter, probably will not
solve the problem as presented in the more active setting of the stock exchange.
But the requirements of the act are not based solely on the belief that the investor will learn to protect himself. Information is brought to his attention by
the newspaper publicity given to the rulings and releases of the commission
concerning security issues," ° and he benefits indirectly from the very existence
of the prospectus and the widespread disclosure it brings about. Thus information which prior to the Securities Act was often undisclosed even to institutional buyers is now made available to investment counsel, the investment department of banks, and financial advisory services.
In view of the possibility of reliance upon the earlier interpretations of the
act by brokers acting for a controlling person, it may be argued that the commission's application of the new interpretation to transactions which occurred
before the interpretation was announced is tantamount to retroactive law making.2" It is to be observed that not only are there possibilities of penal liabilities,

as in the instant case, but that brokers are also subject to civil liabilities to purof material and effort under the present ruling which requires a final prospectus which duplicates most of the material found in the "red herring." The commission is rather hesitant
concerning the use of a summary. If used at all, it will be used as a supplement to the "red
herring" and not as a substitute for it. The summary, like the "red herring," will be required
to reflect the change in the registration statement required by the commission's first letter of
comment and it will be necessary to file copies with the commission a certain stated period of
time before'its use. Dissemination of Information in a Securities Act Registration Statement
before the Effective Date, Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 3165 (1946). The SEC has
announced the adoption of the proposal with respect to the use of the "red herring" in Rule
131 under the Securities Act of 1933. This rule will be effective for a trial period of six months.
The use of the summary has been postponed for further consideration. Chicago Journal of
Commerce, p. i, col. 2 (Dec. 6, 1946).
2OA release concerning an issue of securities of the Hayes Mfg. Corp. offers an excellent
example of how the commission through the newspaper publicity afforded its releases protects the investor. Although the issuer had amended his registration statement to eliminate
the deficiencies found by the commission, the commission, contrary to its customary practice, deemed it necessary to the public interest to release its comment upon the deficiencies.

In the Matter of Hayes Mfg. Corp., Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 3151 (1946); Chicago
Journal of Commerce, p. 7, col. i (Aug. 20, 1946); "How to Make $3,788,ooo on $17,000; SEC
Gets Details," Chicago Daily News, p. 26, col. 2 (Aug. 20,1946). This practice assures public

knowledge of the matter and tends to "chill the market." Underwriters hesitate to handle the
security not only for fear that it will not sell but because of the undesirability of associating
their names with a dubious venture.
21This administrative practice is probably unassailable, however, on the theory that the
SEC is not changing the meaning of the statute but merely expressing what has always been
the true meaning. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129 (i936). That
the present interpretation coincides with the intent to separate exempt and non-exempt
transactions on the distinction between the trading and the distribution of securities is
supported by the comment of the House Committee on § 4(2), "Paragraph (2) exempts the
ordinary brokerage transaction. Individuals may thus dispose of their securities according to
the method which is now customary without any restrictions imposed either upon the individual or the broker. This exemption also assures an open market for securities at all times,
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chasers under this ruling2 But since a redistribution such as that involved in the
instant case may present all the dangers attendant upon a new offering of securities, the commission's ruling assures to the purchasing public at least the
minimum protection which the Securities Act affords. To rule otherwise would
not only deny to the general purchaser the benefits afforded by secondary
sources of information and the protection of more rigorous provisions pertaining
to civil liability afforded by the Securities Act of 1933, but would also deny the
use of the prospectuses to that minority of prospective purchasers who may
actually utilize them.
even though a stop order against further distribution of such securities may have been entered.
Purchasers, provided they are not dealers, may thus, in the event that a stop order has been
entered, cut their losses immediately, if there are losses, by disposing of the securities. On the
other hand, the entry of a stop order prevents any further distribution of the security."
The meaning of § 4(2) is further illuminated by the House Committee's comment or; § 2(12)
which defines the term "dealer" to include brokers. "Transactions by a broker, however, provided they are true brokerage transactions, are not brought within the scope of the bill by the
specific exemptions granted in paragraph (2) of section 4. The sole object of this definition is
thus to subject brokers to the same advertising restrictions that are imposed upon dealers, so
as to prevent the broker from being used as a cloak for the sale of securities." H. Rep. 85,
73d Cong., ist Sess. i4, i6 (1933).
-48 Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77k (1941); 48 Stat. 84 (1933), I5 U.S.C.A.

§ 771 (I941).

